Introduction
The European Union (EU) is unique; it is neither a state nor an international organization. Over many years, the EU has incrementally developed its own statelike foreign policy, which since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty is labelled 'external action'. One important dimension of the EU's state-like international appearance is participation in international legal regimes. The Court of Justice's concern for the autonomy of the EU legal order has in the past been one of the greatest internal obstacles to EU participation. Particular concerns have been raised by membership in international organizations and signing of multilateral conventions where these international regimes set up (quasi-) judicial bodies, which were feared to threaten the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice over the EU legal order.
Any participation in international legal regimes leads to the surrender of some autonomy. When a state or the EU becomes a member of an international organization, it has signed up under international law to respect the rules of that organization. This usually means that it is bound by: 1) the founding treaties (primary law), 2) the decisions of the political organs (secondary law), and 3) the decisions of any (quasi-) judicial organs (quasi-judicial decisions). This third category of (quasi-) judicial decisions is the focus of this paper because in the past they have been seen as the greatest threat to the autonomy of the EU legal order. The two most problematic and well-known examples are decisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism and rulings of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
In principle, when joining an international organization or signing a convention the EU is in the same position as any other member or signatory party.
Yet as we will see, the Court of Justice has been particularly cautious about accepting the 'normative impact' of (quasi-) judicial decisions. Normative impact refers here to the legally binding force and status of these decisions within the EU legal order. This entails that the focus is on decisions that are legally binding on the EU under international law. The effects of not legally binding instruments are by no means denied but they are not central to the present discussion. This paper focuses on the Court of Justice's concern that the decisions of (quasi-) judicial bodies of international organizations threaten the autonomy of the EU legal order. It addresses the following questions: How does, will and should the Court of Justice deal with the decisions of these two (quasi-) judicial bodies? What could be the reasons for the Court of Justice's concern about the autonomy of the EU legal order? Indeed, should it be more concerned about the autonomy of the EU than constitutional courts are concerned about national autonomy? Section One gives an overview of the Court of Justice's long-standing concern for the autonomy of the EU legal order, in particular with regard to international judicial bodies. It then discusses why the decisions of (quasi-) judicial bodies should be analyzed separately from the founding treaties or conventions (primary law). Section Two turns to the EU's membership in the WTO and the Court of Justice's approach to WTO dispute decisions. Section Three addresses the negotiations on the EU's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the decisions of the ECtHR.
Even though the two legal regimes serve very different purposes and are structurally difficult to compare, both regimes are more 'constitutionalized' than other specialized international legal regimes. This is largely due to their developed enforcement mechanisms and the constitutional discourse resulting from that. Also, it was argued that at present (before EU accession to the ECHR) the Court of Justice treats 'the "Geneva system" in many ways like the "Strasbourg system".' 1 Both legal regimes are rule-based and benefit from predictability and effectiveness. Other examples of international (quasi-) judicial bodies do not lend themselves for comparison because they either do not exercise a form of jurisdiction that is likely to create a threat to the EU's autonomy, 2 or demonstrate great deference to the Court of 
EU Autonomy
Participation in international organizations is a simple fact of life for States.
For an international actor with certain state-like functions as the EU, participation in international organizations has become a necessity for effective policy-making and to fulfil the tasks conferred to it by the EU Treaties.
The Case Law
One specific problem flowing from the participation of the EU in international organizations is what is usually called the protection or preservation of the 'autonomy' of the EU legal order. 4 Concern for the EU's autonomy has guided the Court of Justice's case law internally, 5 but also externally in its opinions on the compatibility of international agreements with the Treaties. 6 Internally and hence towards the Member States, the focus has been the primacy of EU law over national law. Ultimately, this includes the monopoly of review by the Court of Justice, 7 but not a monopoly of interpretation of EU law. To the contrary, Member States' courts must interpret and give effect to EU law as part of a hierarchal structure with the Court of Justice on the apex. Their autonomy as 'EU courts' must be protected from international bodies. 8 Externally, the Court of Justice's particular concern has been its own autonomy vis-à-vis other (quasi-) judicial bodies. This started with Opinion 1/76 on the European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, 9 and the Court of Justice has returned to the autonomy of the EU judiciary several times: in Opinion 1/91 on the European Economic Area (EEA), 10 in Opinion 2/94 on the accession of the Community to the ECHR, 11 and in Opinion 1/00 on the European Common Aviation Area, 12 as well as in the case of Mox Plant. 13 These cases have been examined in much detail in the literature. It might be worth adding a few remarks about a recent case though. In Opinion 1/09, on the creation of a unified patent litigation system, 14 the autonomy of the EU legal order, and in particular of the EU judiciary, was the decisive argument to declare the draft agreement in question 4 See on this issue and on the case law discussed in this section: Jan Willem van Rossem, The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?, Section 2. [1977] ECR 741. In this case, the CoJ rejected the establishment of a fund tribunal consisting of six of its own judges. It expressed concern about the possibility of conflict of jurisdiction in the event of two parallel preliminary ruling procedures on the interpretation of the agreement (one before the fund tribunal and one before the CoJ) and on the impartiality of those judges that sit on both judicial bodies. 10 Hence, the autonomy concern is ongoing and extends not only to the substantive interpretation of EU law but also to the EU law functions of the courts of the Member States.
However, the Court confirmed as a matter of principle in the EEA Opinion that the EU can be a party to an international agreement that sets up a judicial body to solve disputes between the contracting parties and that the Court of Justice would be bound by that judicial body's interpretation of the international agreement. 16 The greatest obstacle in the past appears to have been the fear that another judicial body might give binding rulings on issues of EU law. 17 It is fair to say that the autonomy of the EU legal order is an old but ongoing concern of the Court of Justice, which is not likely to go away any time soon. On the contrary, with the increasing quantity and quality (impact) of cross-border activities in a globalized world the autonomy of domestic structures will come further under pressure.
The Greatest Threat to Autonomy: (Quasi-) Judicial Decisions?
This section explains why (quasi-) judicial decisions of international organizations should be discussed separately from the founding treaties or convention ('primary law') and the 'secondary law' adopted by political bodies of these international organizations. In the case of the WTO, these are the decisions of the Appellate Body and in the case of the ECHR these are rulings by the Strasbourg Court. 15 Ibid, para 80-81. 16 Opinion 1/91, re EEA, paras 39-40: The EU's 'capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entail the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such an agreement as regards the interpretation and application of its provisions'. 17 Ibid, para 33-36.
It makes sense to look at (quasi-) judicial decisions separately; 18 not only because the Court of Justice's concern with the autonomy of the EU legal order is particularly directed towards (quasi-) judicial decisions that might contain interpretations of EU law, but also because of their nature. (Quasi-) judicial decisions are a specific and binding interpretation of general rules.
(Primary) WTO law for instance leaves WTO members considerable room for manoeuvre, while WTO dispute decisions are very specific and 'shall be […] unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute'. 19 The WTO Appellate Body is called 'body' rather than court or tribunal and its decisions are called 'reports' and need to be formally approved by the WTO's highest political organ, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). However, they are confirmed pursuant to negative consent where a decision is adopted by the DSB except when all WTO members oppose it Another question could be whether it should make a difference whether or not a State or the EU is party to the proceedings and hence directly obliged under international law to give effect to the ruling. In this sense, (quasi-) judicial decisions could be seen as limited in scope. However, both the case law of the ECtHR 22 and the decisions of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism function through the building of a precedent-based system that leads to an autonomous interpretation of the Convention and WTO law respectively, to which later decisions refer. Therefore, for the present discussion on the normative impact of these decisions in the domestic legal order, the difference between the proceedings to which a State or the EU is a 18 See for an argument in favour of direct effect of WTO dispute decisions but against direct effect of WTO law more broadly: Eeckhout, 2011, pp. 375 et seq. 19 See Article 17(14) Dispute Settlement Understanding. 20 Ibid. 21 Article 53 ECHR: The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are parties. Article 54 ECHR: The judgement of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution. 22 Greer, 2003 goes as far as arguing that the ECtHR's primary function is 'constitutional justice' rather than 'individual justice'. This is of course subject to societal change, see: ECtHR, Cossey v. UK (application no. 10843/84), Judgment (Plenary), 27 September 1990, Series A, Vol. 184, para 35. party and those where this is not the case is limited. The main difference remains that, e.g. in the case of the ECtHR, it appears easier for a State and its national courts to distinguish decisions that concerned other States on the facts: they concerned after all a different domestic legal system and hence a different situation.
The Present: the EU in the WTO
In any international organization or convention regime, there is a positive correlation between the level of constitutionalization and the normative impact of that regime. Normative impact is often used as an argument for the need for greater constitutional constraints. At the same time, as can be best demonstrated with the example of the EU 23 this results in a circular development between factors that reinforce each other: a greater normative impact requires a higher level of constitutionalization and a higher level of constitutionalization entails greater effectiveness, enforceability and/or legitimacy, all of which cumulate in a greater normative impact. This is also true for the development from the GATT to the WTO. EU accession to the ECHR is and will be different from EU accession to the WTO. International trade is as a subject matter very different from human rights, both in terms of political loading and in terms of EU competence. Further, the two are structurally different. The WTO is based on negotiation. The ECHR simply requires compliance. EU accession to the ECHR raises different and complex questions of EU constitutional law, including in the long term and after all the technicalities have been agreed. However, at this point the WTO can serve as a point of comparison, mainly because the WTO and the ECHR are both fairly welldeveloped, i.e. constitutionalized, specialized international legal regimes. Both have been subject in the constitutional discourse that is grounded in a not state-bound 23 The effectiveness of EU law is the result of the interplay between the Member States' acceptance of supremacy and direct effect (normative impact) on the one hand and a strong court and respect for the rule of law and human rights (constitutionalization) on the other. understanding of what is constitutional. 24 The ECtHR has repeatedly referred to the ECHR as 'constitutional instrument of European public order '. 25 To better understand what is meant by 'constitutional' in the context of a nonstate structure, it is helpful to look at the criteria Neil Walker has developed in this context. 26 He mentions: (1) development of an explicit constitutional discourse; (2) claim to foundational legal authority; (3) development of jurisdictional scope/sphere of competences; (4) claim to interpretative autonomy; (5) institutional structure governing the polity; (6) criteria, rights and obligations of citizenship; and (7) representation of membership. Both for the WTO and of the ECHR, the judicalization of the regime is the most important constitutionalizing factor. Judicalization has established and defended the 'jurisdictional scope', a certain 'interpretative autonomy', with subscription to 'rule of law values such as certainty, predictability and consistent and coherent reasoning '. 27 This in turn has led to a constitutional discourse. Hence, while neither the WTO nor the ECHR can compare with the EU in terms of constitutionalization, they both have entered some form of constitutional discourse and this is predominantly the case because of their powerful (quasi-) judicial bodies, which have also determined the normative impact of these legal regimes.
Participation
The WTO is the most powerful international organization that the EU has joined as a full member. It is probably also the most successful example of EU participation in any international organization. The Agreement Establishing the WTO is a mixed agreement, which means that both the Union and, in the case of the WTO, all Member States are parties. 28 The legal reason for this construction is that 24 For the WTO see: Walker, 2001 the Commission conducts the consultations 34 and takes up defence in the panel. 35 However, it should not be forgotten that the EU and the GATT did not fall in love at first sight. Indeed, the GATT's most important principle of non-discrimination, the most-favoured-nation rule, and European integration stand in open conflict with each other -at least in principle. 36 At the beginning, there was also resistance from GATT signatories, who ultimately accepted the status quo. 37 Today, this is of course history. The EU's role in the WTO is largely uncontested. It has virtually replaced the Member States.
Decisions of the WTO Appellate Body
While the WTO could be largely seen as lacking the capacity to produce secondary law, it has an exceptionally well-developed dispute settlement mechanism and produces hence quasi-judicial decisions that do not require consent and that are subject to an enforcement mechanism (trade sanctions). As is well-known and possibly discussed too often, 38 the Court of Justice does not give direct effect to decisions of the WTO dispute mechanism. This means that these decisions cannot directly be used as yardstick against which acts of the EU institutions can be reviewed. On appeal in the case of Biret, 39 36 As a matter of principle this has not changed even though Article XXIV GATT has solved the legal problem. 37 Licková, 2008, 473. 38 Paasivierta and Kuijper, 2005 45 The situation is comparable to the discussion on future scenarios in which the ECtHR might give binding rulings in which it touches upon questions of internal EU law. 46 problematic, the Appellate Body has displayed considerable deference towards the EU. In the case of Selected Customs Matters, for instance, the Appellate Body was essentially invited to declare that the entire EU customs system was not sufficiently coherent. 47 However, it chose not to enter into this argument.
The Future: the EU in the European Convention on Human Rights

Accession Negotiations
The most topical example of the EU becoming a contracting party to an international convention is its accession to the ECHR. 48 The accession discussion has been going on since the 1970s 49 Jean Paul Jacqué predicted that accession of the EU to the ECHR will 'deprive academics and lawyers involved in the European legal discourse of one of their favourite topics of discussion ', 52 namely what the relationship between the two courts should be and how to deal with conflicting substantive decisions. Yet as Jacqué's further analysis demonstrates, not all issues have been finally resolved and also actual accession might still be a long way ahead. 53 Jacqué, 2011. 53 The CDDH submitted the draft accession agreement (8 th Working Meeting of the CDDH Informal Working Group on the Accession of the European Union to the European issue is for instance that the EU may make reservations, declarations and derogations under the Convention when it accedes to the ECHR. 54 The Convention is not one comprehensive list of human rights. It consists of multiple protocols 55 that need to be separately ratified and contracting parties to the ECHR, including EU Member States, have chosen not to be bound by particular provisions (reservation). 56 An example is the UK's reservation to Article 2 of the First Protocol, the right to education, in which the UK states that it will respect parents' religious and philosophical convictions to the extent that this is compatible with providing efficient instruction and training and avoids unreasonable public expenditure. The EU's reservation will determine the scope of protection under the Convention for the whole realm of EU law, including for the Member States when acting within that realm, be it by implementing EU law or even by derogating from EU law.
The EU's concern with autonomy was one of the dominant points of discussion in the negotiation of the terms of the EU's accession to the ECHR. 57 On the side of the ECHR, further technical and legal modifications, such as the establishment of the co-respondent mechanism, 58 are required to ensure the EU's autonomy. 59 The co-respondent mechanism is aimed to address the difficulty of apportioning responsibility. Apportioning responsibility is not the same as (2011)009). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as both Courts will give their opinion on the agreement. It will then need to be adopted by the Committee of Ministers. The EU will finally accede to the ECHR after the accession agreement has entered into force, which will be the case after it is ratified by all states parties to the ECHR as well as the EU itself. 54 Document CDDH-UE (2011) drawn up with an eye on the Convention than the other way around, the substantive overlap is comparable.
Finally, the Court of Justice might be asked to give an opinion on the compatibility of the (future) ECHR accession agreement with EU law. Yet, it is hard to imagine that the Court will block the way to accession. This was similar when the Court was asked to give an Opinion on the WTO Agreement. 65 Here too, it would have been a disaster if internal quarrels had hindered the EU to accede to the WTO.
The EU had already taken over large part of the Member States' activities in the WTO.
Comparing to the Status Quo
The question is whether at present (before EU accession to the ECHR) the ECtHR could not be seen as facing the exact same questions of allocating (rather than apportioning) responsibility between the EU and its Member States. The EU cannotuntil accession -be held responsible before the Strasbourg Court. This does not exclude holding the Member States responsible under the ECHR even if they merely execute or implement EU law. 66 Yet, their responsibility does not cover the actions of the EU that cannot be attributed to them. In the case of Connolly for instance, the ECtHR rejected the admissibility of an application of an employee of the European Commission challenging on several accounts a disciplinary procedure that had resulted in the suspension of the applicant from work. 67 The decision of whether the Member States can be held responsible for actions of the EU or whether the actions exclusively fall within the independent internal EU sphere also require an interpretation of the internal workings of the EU. The difference after accession will be that the EU itself is bound under international law to accept the ECtHR's rulings and give effect to them. This will place the Court of Justice in the position to have to determine their binding force and status within the EU legal order.
It might seem exaggerated to consider Connolly as an example of a type of ruling that could threaten the autonomy of the EU. However, this case turns on the question of whether the contested act was an act of the EU or whether it was an act of 65 Opinion 1/94, re WTO Agreement 66 ECtHR, Bosphorus, supra note 25. 67 ECtHR, Connolly vs Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and is '"binding in its entirety" and "directly applicable" in all member States [which] means that it takes effect in the internal legal orders of member States without the need for domestic implementation'. 69 The nature of regulations was and still is straightforwardly determined by the European Treaties. 70 Examining the nature and extent of Member States' obligations under EU law however can also be more difficult and controversial. This would be the case for instance, if the ECtHR was to examine one of the EU law concepts based on case law, such as the direct effect of directives or the obligation of consistent interpretation -or primacy for that matter.
A particular problem could arise from the lack of jurisdiction under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP is a policy area in which, even after Lisbon, the Court of Justice does not have the power to give preliminary rulings and can receive direct actions for review of legality (not interpretation) only as far as they are directed against a very specific measure, namely CFSP decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of TFEU are still based on a pre-Lisbon common position that is governed by preLisbon rules and remains consequently outside of the Court's reach. Fourth, if counter-terrorist sanctions against individuals have taught us anything it is that the EU institutions are willing to interpret their Treaty powers creatively to adopt whatever measure they deem necessary. Hence, CFSP measures of the future could impact on the rights of individuals in ways that we cannot predict today. However particularly in the area of CFSP, EU accession to the ECHR could, from the perspective of the individual, make all the difference between having access to justice or not, since actions of the EU will no longer fall outside the personal scope of the Strasbourg Court's jurisdiction. 75
Decisions of the ECtHR under Domestic Law
Rather than making the EU more of a 'human rights organization' 76 comparable to the ECHR, accession will place the EU in a position more similar to its Member States. However, the fact that the EU will be in a state-like position as The GFCC accepts the ECHR as binding at the level of ordinary laws but uses it as an interpretation aid only for constitutional matters. Indeed, even in cases to which Germany has been a party and where it is consequently legally bound to give effect to under international law, 81 the GFCC only 'takes account of the valuations made by the ECtHR '. 82 Indeed, the GFCC's approach to the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR can -as regards the outcome, not the argument -be compared to the current (preaccession) approach of the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice has given the ECHR special significance in the EU legal order and taken much inspiration from it, including long before a reference to the ECHR was incorporated into the Treaties. 83 More recently the Court has even dropped its traditional 'general principles' or 'source of inspiration' approach and has started referring directly to the rights guaranteed in the ECHR. 84 and take long. The most practical solution will be to continue to rely on judicial dialogue in different degrees and shades, which would allow being bound in practice with (hypothetical) reservations toward decisions on internal matters of EU law.
After accession the ECtHR's decisions will be formally binding on the Union as a matter of international law. This could in an extreme case result in a finding of noncompliance if the Court of Justice rejects an interpretation of the ECtHR of internal matters of EU law. However, it seems that in most cases it will be possible to reconcile an interpretative difference in a way that does not result in non-compliance.
Finally, the logic behind the ECHR is different from the WTO Agreement.
While it is doubtful whether WTO dispute decisions leave room for negotiation, as the Court assumes, the WTO Agreement is a framework in which members negotiate with each other on a formally equal footing. In the ECHR, the core objective is to protect citizens from their States. This is not even formally based on the assumption of equality, or reciprocity for that matter. Finally, while there might be political or economic considerations to delay compliance with a WTO dispute decision, it is more difficult to see why the EU should not immediately give effect to a decision of the ECtHR, e.g. legislative reform to prevent similar violations or individual measures to erase the consequences, such as compensation. It seems more difficult to see an overriding domestic policy consideration that would justify delay in the latter case. 95 Final paragraph of the preamble of the draft agreement.
Autonomy and Sovereignty in a Globalized World
The increased intensity of interaction between international and domestic law has become a platitude. Generally speaking, States have started giving greater consideration to these growing sovereignty constraints resulting from international law. Their concerns usually focus on the protection of individuals and of national power structures from uncontrollable effects flowing from international law. 96 The EU's relationship with international law is complex and it would be an over-simplification to say that the EU is more concerned about its autonomy than 'States'. Also, as we have seen with regard to the ECHR, there is not one approach of understanding: so long as the EU is not a State (which it is not and for all its difference in territorial and hierarchical organisation never will be) it must still be an international organization. The EU's 'difference' (neither State nor international organization) is not recognized by international law that treats it, by want of an adequate frame of reference, as an international organization. A telling example is the responsibility of States versus the responsibility of international organizations. In 96 This is probably best illustrated by the discussions around counter-terrorist sanctions against individuals: Eckes, 2009. 97 Article 2(1) UN Charter; Kelsen, 1966, pp. 290-294 and 551-588; Brownlie, 2008. 98 October 2011, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted a set of draft articles, together with commentaries thereto, on the responsibility of international organizations. 102 The ILC recommended to the General Assembly to take note of the draft articles in a resolution and to annex them to the resolution, and to consider, at a later stage, the elaboration of a convention on the basis of the draft articles. 103 The draft articles set out a general framework and have the advantage of organising the field in a 'one-size fits all' 104 way that avoids being lost in exceptions and specificities.
At the same time, they do not take account of the diversity of international organisation, the 'specific nature' of the EU, and the EU's 'real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or transfer of powers from the [Member] States to the [EU]'. 105 The ILC has also been critical at other occasions about legal constructions that result from the EU's differentness. 106 While States are considered as solid-blocks, i.e. as one entity whose internal structure is irrelevant to the responsibility it owes to third parties, the situation is more complicated for International human rights regimes are seen as a particular threat to State 110 See e.g. Hobbes, 1651, p. 155. 111 Hart, 1961, 217. 112 Hathaway, 2008, pp. 120 et seq: (1) authority to govern, (2) supremacy, (3) independence and (4) a territory over which this authority is exercised. See also : Balke, 2009 , who analyses the limits of democratically legitimised sovereignty. 113 Beck, 2002, 48-9. 114 Changes of the concept of state responsibility: from a territorial to a personal link understanding… 115 Snyder, 2010 , p. 12. See also: Hollis, 2005 E.g. when they delegate powers to external bodies (Art 24(1) of the German Constitution: 'Der Bund kann durch Gesetz Hoheitsrechte auf zwischenstaatliche Einrichtungen übertragen.'). 117 Hathaway, 2008, pp. 115 internally. Yet, it has faced and still faces an uphill struggle to establish itself as a polity in its own right that enjoys a degree of sovereignty separate from its Member States. The EU law is of a highly integrated nature; it develops under the dicta of the Court of Justice, which has much helped to establish its differentness. Even if under international law actors are held to act in good faith 123 there is no equivalent to the 118 Wotopka and Tsutsui, 2008, pp. 724 et seq. 119 See for the distinction between negative liberty (free of constraints) and positive liberty (the possibility to achieve certain objectives) : Berlin, 1969, p. 180 . Many constraints but certainly the growing interdependence lie outside of the influence of states and are hence not subject to their consent. 120 The most well-known example here is the discussion surrounding the Member States' potential international responsibility if the EU fails to give effect to UN Security Council resolutions imposing counter-terrorist sanctions against individuals. 121 See e.g.: Articles 25 and 32(1) of the German Constitution or Article VI of the US Constitution. 122 This requires of course that the entity qualifies as state in the first place. 123 Good faith is seen as 'perhaps the most important general principle, underpinning many international legal rules' (Shaw, 2003, p. 97 Neframi, 2010. 125 Ibid, p. 323. 126 For an argument on the importance of the latter see: Hoeksma, 2011. 127 See comprehensively: Gerken, Rieble, Günter, Stein, and Streinz, 2009. 128 For a good overview see: Hlavac, 2010. 129 Many national Constitutions confer a particular status on EU law, different from international law: Article 23 of the German Constitution; The Dutch Raad van State no longer refers to Article 94 of the Dutch Constitution (effect of binding obligations of international law in the national legal order) but accepts primacy as flowing directly from EU law (e.g.: ABRvS, Metten, 7 July 1995, AB 1997, 117); Section 2(1) of the UK European Communities Act of 1972 that 'is expressed in forthright terms which are absolute and all-embracing. Any rights or obligations created by the Treaty are to be given legal effect in England without more ado (Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] Ch 401, 419, per Lord Denning.). 130 The majority of international agreements concluded by the EU are mixed agreements (see e.g.: Hillion and Koutrakos (eds), 2010. 131 Licková, 2008, at 464. admittedly not present from the very beginning. However, the same is true for the internal recognition and it could also be argued that the EU has still some work to do until the citizens of the Member States also identify with their role as EU citizens. 132 Externally, this struggle raises the question of whether the EU aspires to be recognised as a sovereign actor and whether it should do so.
The autonomy of the EU is understood as largely meaning that the EU has its own separate legal and political existence that cannot be linked back to the sovereignty of the Member States and that is not in practice controlled by them. Yet, this autonomy is an autonomy of practice which makes a claim to (limited) sovereignty that by definition cannot based on the classical understanding of (undivided) sovereignty. It could be argued that any decision of the Court of Justice against EU accession to the ECHR and aiming to protect the EU's autonomy will in actual fact cut both ways. First, a negative decision would mean that the EU cannot Union as capable to participate in specialised international legal regimes on (near) equal footing with States. This 'third party' recognition of the EU's special features creates a significant legal fact for international law. 136 Perhaps general international law should either simply follow suit or move away from sovereignty and instead recognise autonomous rights including of non-state entities? Second, a negative decision based on the fear that the EU might lose its autonomy when treated on equal footing with States highlights -to say the least -the EU's weaknesses on this point.
By way of conclusion, the EU has evolved into a new type of actor within international law without international law being able to fully recognise this fact.
This contradiction explains to some extent the EU's concern about its own autonomy.
It is under particular pressure because international law does not recognise the existence of EU sovereignty separate from its Member States.
Conclusions: If the EU can have its cake and eat it, it should also do so!
Interpreting case law and identifying legal rules and principles are the tasks of legal scholars. These are daunting tasks in face of the Delphic case law of the Court of Justice in the area of external relations. Caution is advised to draw too far-reaching general conclusions from individual cases that might be limited to their particular circumstances. 137 However, it appears fair to say that the Court of Justice has a longstanding and ongoing concern for autonomy of the EU legal order. Further, in a world where the autonomy of international players is exposed to more and more external constraints this concern is unlikely to go away. At the same time, the EU's accession to the ECHR might lead the Court to accept for the first time the binding force and direct effect of another court's decisions on a subject matter (human rights) that places great constraints on autonomy.
The negotiations surrounding accession of the EU to the ECHR, as the probably most influential human rights regime, is the most recent example where the EU's autonomy concern has posed and will continue to pose many questions. It will be interesting to see the Court of Justice's understanding of the precise status and effects of decisions of the ECtHR within the EU legal order. Generally speaking, while the Court of Justice has taken a balanced intermediate approach to international law and its effects within the EU legal order, 138 it has been cautious with the effects of decisions of (quasi-) judicial bodies. Indeed, so far it has not Koutrakos (eds), 2011, 111. 138 Eckes, 2010. accepted to be bound by the decisions of any external (quasi-) judicial body. Yet, both EU law (Article 6(3) TEU) and the status of the ECHR ('constitutional instrument of European public order') can be cited in support of the argument that decisions of the ECtHR require and deserve a greater force than decisions of other external (quasi-) judicial bodies, including the WTO dispute settlement bodies. However, the choice is not black and white. The Court of Justice could generally accept the binding force and direct effect of decisions of the ECtHR but express reservations if and when the ECtHR goes too far in interpreting EU law. On the substantive level, the ECHR lays down a minimum standard 139 only and the ECtHR has been firm in its rulings but cautious to establish a margin of appreciation for the Contracting Parties. With particular regard to the Court of Justice it has even gone one step further by establishing a presumption of equivalent protection. 140 Deference appears to be the soft approach by international courts that have no interest to accept a complete EU shield that would turn the EU into a federation and would no longer allow the court to directly hold Member States responsible.
One conclusion could be that the danger for the autonomy of the EU legal order has taken too central of a place in the discussion surrounding EU accession to the ECHR. We have seen that the current situation (the EU is not a Contracting Party) does not exclude pronouncements on aspects of internal EU law either when the ECtHR determines whether Member States can be held responsible or whether the particular act in question falls exclusively within the realm of influence of the EU institutions.
At the same time, the EU is a very complex legal construction with many actors that claim their position on the international plane and do not stand in a clear hierarchical relationship to each other, but also the foundations, separateness and differentness of the EU are to a large extent based on case-law. The argument put forward in this chapter is that the importance that the Court of Justice attaches to the external autonomy of the EU legal order vis-à-vis international law can partially be explained by the outdated concept of sovereignty under general international law.
Under general international law, the EU is confronted with a binary choice between 'state' or 'international organization' that does not correspond to its reality. Over time, the EU has asserted a position of relative sovereignty that is different from States but also different from international organizations.
Even though national constitutional courts interpret open-ended national constitutions and shape the principles and values on which a State is based, the very existence of state sovereignty is not based on case-law. Interpretations of the ECtHR could seriously constitute a threat to the complex EU construction, both in terms of internal power division and in terms of trust of EU citizens in the EU endeavour. The EU has chosen to shield its Member States in the WTO. Will it do the same in the field of human rights? From the perspective of legitimacy and trust of its citizens the stakes for taking on responsibility for the sake of establishing competence appear to be higher in the field of human rights. This also raises questions for the ECtHR.
Should the EU's aim be to be treated on equal footing with the other Contracting Parties under the ECHR? Would an extension of the Bosphorus line to all EU law strengthen the EU's autonomy? Extending the Bosphorus approach to all EU law would first of all allow the EU to escape full external control and undermine to some extent the objective of accession. At the same time, the EU construction is so complex that it might require special protection from the influences of international law. So far, both the ECtHR and the Court of Justice have taken a nuanced approach to the matter, shown deference to each other and understanding of differentness of the EU.
If EU can have its cake and eat it -specialized international legal regimes show additional deference and understanding for its differentness, while giving it the rights of states -it should also do so!
